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ABSTRACT
Snowden’s initial revelations aimed at establishing a public debate
on online surveillance informed through the media. Media should
serve the public’s need for information and offer various
viewpoints and sources to enhance public debates. This study
assesses how online surveillance is justiﬁed or countered in British
broadcast news since the 2013 Snowden revelations for ﬁve
selected major events in news coverage ending with the Charlie
Hebdo aftermath in Paris in early 2015. The critical discourse
analysis shows that UK broadcasts cover justiﬁcation and
delegitimation arguments of online surveillance. Online
surveillance legitimation combines rationalisation (terror
prevention) and moral evaluation (public security) arguments,
which are often expressed by governmental actors. The broadcast
discourse tends to give governmental, pro-surveillance actors a
voice by default. The detailedness of terror threat descriptions
increases over time. In 2013, ‘terrorist attacks’ are rather factually
mentioned. In 2015, several ways leading to a loss of lives through
terror are explicitly stated, which strengthens the instrumental
rationality legitimation arguments. Delegitimising arguments
predominantly use moralising and mythopoetic arguments (civil
liberties) that are expressed by Snowden himself or politicians, yet
rarely by non-governmental organisations, and very rarely by
citizens. It is harder for non-governmental actors to continuously
interpret the broadcast discourse. Therefore, what exactly is at
stake when online mass surveillance increases remains obscure in
the news discourse. The surveillance discourse should be richer in
order to give the audience a chance to understand the vague and
less tangible contra-surveillance arguments better.
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1. Introduction
With the Internet and advanced technologies, people experience an increase of online and
ofﬂine mass surveillance and a reduction of privacy. Since the 9/11 attacks in the USA, the
7/7 attacks in the UK, and more recently since Snowden’s revelations, media attention
towards surveillance practices and technologies has increased in the UK as well as globally
(Barnard-Wills, 2011). Since journalistic language may be related to power or ideologies
© 2016 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
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and is described to exert power to the audience (Branum & Charteris-Black, 2015;
Richardson, 2007) in an age of growing mediatisation (Christensen & Jansson, 2015), it
is important to assess how online surveillance is discussed and justiﬁed or countered in
the news media. In his normative theory of media and society, McQuail (2005, p. 170)
argues that media has to conduct in a public interest, ‘being a vehicle for advancing free-
dom and democracy’ and ‘serving the public’s need for information and comment and
providing the platforms for expression of diverse ideas.’ Lyon (2002, p. 251) requests
that ‘some social practices and technological systems that affect everyone [… ] [need to
be] understood and actively negotiated by everyone.’ Citizens must be able to understand
what is at stake with mass surveillance to ‘stand up for their freedom’ (Gürses, Kundnani,
& van Hoboken, 2016, p. 582). An adequate media coverage would establish online sur-
veillance as a salient issue enabling and enhancing a public debate about surveillance,
which was Snowden’s initial intention to become a whistle blower (Guardian US, 2013).
So, how well did the media do?
Generally speaking, media discourses occur within wider processes of social and cul-
tural change, power relations, and ideological societal processes (Fairclough, 1995). Differ-
ent actors and content compete for interpretative dominance of the media discourse.
Government discourses may strive to ‘discipline the citizenry’ (Simone, 2009, p. 12) and
the media takes up politicians’ arguments, among others, to build up its agenda (van
Leeuwen &Wodak, 1999, p. 111). Broadcast news reports to a lay public audience accord-
ing to speciﬁc news making principles and processes, which may differentiate across news
outlets, for example, depending on economic constraints or editorial stance (see e.g., Sup
Park, 2014). Previous research has not analysed the broadcasting surveillance discourse,
although it is a major information source of the public. The goal of the present analysis
is to trace the British broadcast news debates on online surveillance. We decode discursive
formation about online surveillance in broadcast news using critical discourse analysis of
the broadcast ‘data’ to reveal how online surveillance was represented and (de)legitimised
according to van Leeuwen and Wodak’s (1999) legitimation strategies.
This study analyses the online surveillance discourse in British broadcast news for ﬁve
selected events, that is, (1) the Snowden revelations in June 2013, (2) the snooping on
embassies and world leaders, (3) the detention of David Miranda, (4) the report into
the death of Lee Rigby, and ending with (5) the Charlie Hebdo aftermath in January
and February 2015. The research questions are as follows.
RQ 1. How is online surveillance (de)legitimised in the broadcast news debate through
major events of Snowden’s unveiling, the David Miranda detention, the snooping on embas-
sies and world leaders, the Lee Rigby report, and the Charlie Hebdo aftermath?
RQ 2. What actors and sources articulate opinions on online surveillance and to what
extend are citizens’ voices included in the broadcast news debate?
2. Literature review
2.1. Surveillance, privacy, and the state
Surveillance is described as means to secure the existence of a state and the security of its
citizens. Lyon (2004, p. 135) deﬁnes surveillance as ‘the rationalised control of information
within modern organisations, and involves in particular processing personal data for the
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purposes of inﬂuence, management, or control’, globally catalysed by the terrorist attacks
of 9/11. One development in the UK is the extensive CCTV surveillance, making Britain
‘the clear world leader in CCTV deployment’ (Lyon, 2004, p. 142). In the digital age, citi-
zens as well as organisations leave manifold footprints online. As a result, ‘We are experi-
encing a reduction in privacy, changes in norms of communicative behaviour, and
unparalleled surveillance by commercial ﬁrms and governments alike’ (Picard, 2015,
p. 37).
Surveillance legislation is typically framed as counter-terrorism laws (MacDonald &
Hunter, 2013; MacDonald, Hunter, & O’Regan, 2013; McGarrity, 2011). The reason for
a need of online surveillance lays in the state’s purpose ‘to ensure the wellbeing of the
population, expressed in its longevity, health and wealth’ (MacDonald & Hunter, 2013,
p. 124). Surveillance is one means of security, which constitutes one form of state
power besides feudal sovereignty and individually restrictive discipline (i.e. through sen-
tencing criminal acts) (Foucault, 2007). Picard (2015) draws parallels to Platonic, Machia-
vellian, and Lockean arguments supporting governmental surveillance, because the state
must protect its population. Especially when the existence of the state is threatened, ‘ordin-
ary morality does not apply’ (Picard, 2015, p. 37) and ‘unlimited surveillance is the unspo-
ken goal (and it is attractive to politicians, police, marketers and high-tech companies
alike)’ (Lyon, 1998, p. 101). Consequently, ‘the all-seeing state […] no longer respects free-
dom’ of citizens (Gürses et al., 2016, p. 580).
Counter-terrorism and preventing violent extremism discourses have appeared more
intensely after the 7/7 attacks on the London transport system, expressed through key-
words such as security, extremism, or terrorism (MacDonald et al., 2013). MacDonald
and Hunter (2013) conclude from an analysis of UK counter-terrorism policy documents
between 2007 and 2011 that the issue of national security remains a central concern in the
background of the 7/7 attacks. Simone (2009, p. 1) shows that the US government dis-
course of surveillance emphasises the ‘government as protector, the American citizen as
innocent and terrorists as a foreign menace’ in order to legitimise the USA PATRIOT
Act. More speciﬁcally, the argumentation follows four premises.
(1) Security is necessary for liberty.
(2) Terrorists have threatened US and global security.
(3) The USA PATRIOT Act improves security.
(4) Thus, the Act, as the symbol for security, enhances liberty.
(Simone, 2009, p. 5)
For explaining surveillance legitimation expressed by the German government in the
background of the ‘NSA-surveillance scandal’ in 2013, Schulze (2015, p. 199) refers to
Max Weber’s typology of authority structures,
either by relying on tradition and norms (‘because it was always done like this’), authority or
charismatic leadership (‘because I say so’) or by giving rational-legal reasons (‘because it is
the most effective way to do this’ or ‘because it is the law’),
whereas the latter is said to be most common in democratic societies. Surveillance was
legitimised through the security of the population and soldiers as well as through the
threat of terrorism. The authority of the law was especially used by the German
INFORMATION, COMMUNICATION & SOCIETY 3
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conservative party to legitimise surveillance, whereas the opposition questioned inconsist-
ent statements of the government and tried to broaden the debate (Schulze, 2015, p. 211).
However, the state risks its democratic existence through overstraining privacy through
mass surveillance. Abu-Laban and Bakan (2012) argue that state interventions framed to
protect the public against terrorism jeopardise the freedom of speech or freedom of assem-
bly. Stoycheff (2016) explores how mass surveillance may silence democratic discourse
through self-censorship of citizens. The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe
(2005) has highlighted that free and unhindered information is most effective for helping
to prevent terrorism:
in their ﬁght against terrorism, states must take care not to adopt measures that are contrary
to human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of expression, which is
one of the very pillars of the democratic societies that terrorists seek to destroy.
In this regard, Coll (2014, p. 1261) argues that privacy should also protect the society and
its democratic values besides protecting individuals. Sloan and Warner (2015) warn that
the massive governmental capacity of knowledge reduces privacy in public and thus risks
people’s ability to adequately manage private information. Normally, people would will-
ingly limit and control their knowledge of each other when they interact based on
norms. In times of surveillance, ‘Governmental surveillance can, and does, undermine
the norm-based coordination on which privacy in public depends’ (Sloan & Warner,
2015, p. 3). Hence, ‘the erosion of privacy can threaten our autonomy, not merely as con-
sumers but as citizens’ (Acquisti, Brandimarte, & Loewenstein, 2015, p. 509).
Gangadharan (2015, p. 12) concludes from a ﬁeld study on US citizens that ‘people “on
the wrong side of the digital divide” did not have the luxury of letting privacy or surveil-
lance concerns dictate choices about how to adopt and interact with digital technologies.’
The state is thus requested to adapt legislation to protect ‘real people – who are naïve,
uncertain, and vulnerable’ and restore ‘the balance of power between those holding the
data and those who are the subjects of that data’ (Acquisti et al., 2015, p. 514). However,
‘Although it is recognized – even within security agencies – that carrying out these [sur-
veillance] activities […] pose risks to democracy […] the public through acquiescence in
pursuit of a perception of security – ﬁnd them useful’ (Picard, 2015, p. 37). Hence, civil
security may win over civil liberty. Yet, a moderate as opposed to an all-seeing state
would not ignore the question of adequacy and proportionality of terrorism-related sur-
veillance legislation.
2.2. Surveillance discourses in the media
In a normative view, the media is regarded as fourth estate fulﬁlling tasks for democracy
through informing citizens and shaping public discourse. According to the Habermas
(1989) ideal of a discursive public sphere, the media discourse should enable rational dis-
cussions. Concerning reporting on surveillance legislation, McGarrity (2011, p. 274) nor-
matively expects the media to publish leaked information and to force ‘agencies to explain
their actions, and thereby enables an intelligent and cool-headed assessment of whether
these are proportionate to the threat of terrorism.’ However, access to information on
national security matters is limited and thus media cannot effectively perform its watch-
dog role (McGarrity, 2011, p. 280). As a result, media performance is criticised and the
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media rather function as government lapdog (McGarrity, 2011), resulting in an agenda
silencing and a poor surveillance discourse (Greenberg & Hier, 2009; Herfroy-Mischler,
2015). Herfroy-Mischler (2015, p. 244) requests media to ‘communicate and legitimize
silences orchestrated by security and intelligence censorship.’
Barnard-Wills (2011) shows that the surveillance discourse in UK newspapers ranges
from preventing criminality to limiting personal liberty. Branum and Charteris-Black
(2015) analyse the reporting strategies on the Snowden affair of three major UK newspa-
pers revealing that news are biased according to the newspaper’s ideology, news values,
and audience considerations. In the Guardian, being a key newspaper publishing Snow-
den’s leaks in the ﬁrst place, surveillance is described as insidious and extensive. The
Guardian uses legal, moral, and public-support arguments to justify reporting. The
Daily Mail reports refer to Snowden’s living situation and personal life and remain neu-
tral and propositional (Branum & Charteris-Black, 2015, p. 210). The Sun’s reporting
defends surveillance through emphasising the damage caused by the leaks and criticises
the Guardian’s reports. Thus, the Sun’s reports reﬂect protection-of-the-state arguments
to legitimise surveillance whereas the Guardian focuses on the risks for democracy and
unlawfulness.
In a linguistic analysis of surveillance discourse themes in UK broadsheets in the period
of 2001–2005, Wiegand (2015) reveals that ‘othering’ is an often used theme, that is,
describing the union of America and Britain (‘us’) versus bin Laden and terrorism
(‘them’), which is also found in an analysis of policy documents on UK counter-terrorism
(MacDonald & Hunter, 2013).
In sum, previous research suggests that the media discourse on surveillance is shaped
by governmental actors and their legitimation strategies and depends on intelligence ser-
vices’ censorship. The British ‘ideologically polarized press’ (Brüggemann, Engesser,
Büchel, Humprecht, & Castro, 2014, p. 1043) often adopts the security and terrorism
reasoning according to their editorial stance (Branum & Charteris-Black, 2015). In
addition to the press, the public-service broadcaster BBC is a popular information source
for publicly relevant issues having a ‘powerful effect […] on the political knowledge of the
citizenry’ (Brüggemann et al., 2014, p. 1058). Thus, we expect that government views legit-
imising surveillance are a major part of broadcast reporting varying according to a broad-
caster’s stance. However, the BBC with its value of impartial, objective, and balanced
reporting should take up a greater variety of viewpoints.
3. Methods
3.1. Sample
Broadcasts were identiﬁed using search terms from two databases, the Television and
Radio Index for Learning and Teaching as well as Box of Broadcasts. The sample frame
contains broadcasts of more than 475 TV and radio channels including all BBC TV
and radio content. The sampling procedure encompasses two steps. First, to gain an over-
view over reports on online surveillance and intelligence services, the broadcast databases
were searched by the terms ‘Edward Snowden,’ ‘GCHQ’, or ‘NSA’ for a two-year period
from 27/06/2013 until 28/06/2015. From this search, ﬁve major events in relation to the
Snowden revelations and surveillance could be identiﬁed.
INFORMATION, COMMUNICATION & SOCIETY 5
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The observation period begins three days after the initial revelations with Snowden’s
unveiling as the source of the leaks on 9 June 2013 and includes four further major events
that were discussed in relation to surveillance. The events include (1) Snowden’s unveiling,
(2) the detention of journalist Glen Greenwald’s partner David Miranda at Heathrow Air-
port under anti-terror legislation, (3) the interception of communications in foreign
embassies and European Union ofﬁces and spying on world leaders’ phone communi-
cations, in particular the German Chancellor Angela Merkel, (4) the publication of the
British parliamentary report into the death of Fusilier Lee Rigby that raised debates
about Facebook and social media companies’ role in tackling terrorism, and (5) the Charlie
Hebdo terror attacks in Paris which prompted debates about digital encryption, freedom
of speech, and the resurrection of the so-called ‘Snoopers’ Charter’ legislation.
Second, key search terms were developed speciﬁcally for each event to ensure that all
broadcasts related to the event are found (see Table 1). Broadcasts were analysed when
the recording was available, which decreased the sample slightly for the David Miranda
and Lee Rigby cases. Analysis was based on the transcripts of each recording.
It is important to note that due to key word searching in short summaries and tran-
scripts of broadcasts, TV programmes had a greater chance to be part of the sample
than radio programmes due to the existence of transcripts for TV (based on their subti-
tles). Thus, the radio programmes that did not contain the search terms in their short sum-
mary are systematically overlooked in our sample.
Four broadcasts are found on Snowden’s unveiling: (1) Sky News At 9 (09/06/13, ca.
6′30′′), (2) BBC NEWS at 10 pm (09/06/13, ca. 4′), (3) BBC NEWS at 3 pm (11/06/13,
ca. 6′), and (4) BBC NEWS at 10 pm (13/06/13, ca. 2′30′′). Whereas the ﬁrst three news
reports were the opener of each news show, the fourth news broadcast is the one presented
towards the end of the news show.
Twelve broadcasts are found on David Miranda, of which for eight the programme
could be obtained: (1) Today, BBC Radio 4, at 7.50 am (19/08/13, ca. 4′40′′), (2) Today,
BBC Radio 4, at 8 am (19/08/13, ca. 1′), (3) BBC News at Ten, at 10 pm (19/08/13, ca.
5′30′′), (4) Drive, BBC Radio 5, at 4 pm (20/08/13, ca. 4′30′′), (5) BBC News at Six, at 6
pm (20/08/13, ca. 5′10′′), (6) Channel 5 News, at 9 pm (20/08/13, ca. 20′′), (7) BBC
News at Ten, at 10 pm (20/08/13, ca. 5′30′′), and (8) The Media Show, BBC Radio 4, at
4.30 pm (21/08/13, ca. 11′30′′).
Two broadcasts were found and obtained relating to the spying on EU ofﬁces: (1) BBC
News, 6.35 pm (30/06/2013, ca. 2′20′′) and (2) BBC News at Ten, 10 pm (30/06/2013, ca.
2′20′′). Both reports are similar.
Eleven broadcasts were found and obtained on the snooping on world leaders: (1) Sky
News At 9, 9 pm (23/10/2013, ca. 2′40′′), (2) Sky News At 10, 10 pm (23/10/2013, ca. 2′40′′),
(3) BBC News, at 9 am (24/10/2013, ca. 7′50′′), (4) Sky News, at 9 am (24/10/2013, ca. 3′),
(5) BBC News, at 10 am (24/10/2013, ca. 5′30′′), (6) BBC News, at 11 am (24/10/2013, ca.
3′30′′), (7) BBC News at One, at 1 pm (24/10/2013, ca. 4′50′′), (8) Breaking News, BBC
NEWS, at 7.45 pm (24/10/2013, ca. 3′10′′), (9) News at eight, BBC NEWS, at 8 pm (24/
10/2013, ca. 4′), (10) Dateline London, BBC NEWS, at 11.30 am (26/10/2013, ca.
11′40′′), and (11) Politics Europe, BBC NEWS, at 5.30 pm (24/10/2013, ca. 4′). The broad-
casts of 23 and 24 October are mostly similar in structure, content, and sources.
Eight broadcasts were detected for the Lee Rigby report, of which the transcripts for
seven could be obtained: (1) Jeremy Vine on BBC Radio 2, 12.00 (25/11/2014, ca. 8′),
6 J. A. LISCHKA
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Table 1. Search terms and number of broadcasts per case.
(1) Edward
Snowden’s
unveiling (2) David Miranda (3) Embassies and world leader snooping (4) Lee Rigby report (5) Charlie Hebdo aftermath
Timeframe 09/06/13–16/06/13 18/08/13–15/09/13 29/06/13–27/07/13 and 11/10/13–08/11/13 15/11/14–13/12/14 07/01/15–04/02/15
Search terms ‘Edward Snowden’ ‘David Miranda’ ‘European Commission’ OR ‘Merkel’s phone’ ‘Lee Rigby’ AND Facebook ‘Charlie Hebdo’ OR Paris AND surveillance
Number of broadcasts
(programmes obtained)
4
(4)
12
(8)
2 (2) (European Commission);
11 (11) (Merkel’s phone)
8
(7)
1 (1)
Source: Compiled by the author.
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(2) BBC News at One, at 1 pm (25/11/2014, 7′), (3) Channel 4 News, at 7 pm (25/11/2014,
ca. 12′), (4) 5 News Update on Channel 4, at 7.55 pm (25/11/2014, ca. 45′′), (5) 5 News
Update on Channel 4, at 8.58 pm (25/11/2014, ca. 10′′), (6) Sky News At Ten, 10 pm
(25/11/2014, ca. 4′), (7) ITV News at Ten & Weather, at 10 pm (25/11/2014, ca. 7′),
and (8) Today in Parliament on BBC Radio 4 (25/11/2014, ca. 7′). Broadcasts (4) and
(5) very brieﬂy summarise the event in one headline and are excluded.
One broadcast was detected on surveillance that refers to the Charlie Hebdo attacks: (1)
Today in Parliament on BBC Radio 4, 11.30 pm (14/01/2015).
3.2. Analytic framework
The deconstruction of discursive formation of arguments concerning surveillance over the
course of the observation period follows a framework for analysis building up on multi-
modal (de)legitimation strategies by van Leeuwen and Wodak (1999), van Leeuwen
(2007), and van Dijk (2006). van Leeuwen and Wodak (1999) and van Leeuwen (2007)
distinguish four sub-categories of justifying strategies, namely (1) authorisation through
personal or impersonal institutionalised authorities (e.g., experts, parent, teacher, the
law, through conformity [‘everybody does it’, use of statistics]), (2) instrumental or theor-
etical rationalisation through purposes (e.g., intrusion into privacy is justiﬁed ‘to protects
rights and freedom of others’ [van Leeuwen & Wodak, 1999, p. 106]), (3) moral abstrac-
tions and evaluations that link activities to values such as leadership and governmental
control, economic values (economic interest of a country), values of public interest,
national security or public order, and (4) mythopoesis through telling stories. Similar legit-
imation strategies were also used in Schulze’s (2015) analysis of the surveillance discourse
of German politicians. In addition, van Dijk (2006, p. 380) describes various forms of posi-
tive self-presentation and negative other-presentation through ‘enhancing the power,
moral superiority and credibility of the speaker(s), and discrediting dissidents, while vili-
fying the Others, the enemy; the use of emotional appeals; and adducing seemingly irre-
futable proofs of one’s beliefs and reasons’.
The primary level of analysis are the cases in order to trace how each case informs the
surveillance debate and public understanding of surveillance. First, each broadcast was
sequentially summarised according to actors and themes. Next, the structure of themes
over all broadcasts per case was analysed and related to legitimacy and delegitimacy
arguments.
4. Results
4.1. Edward Snowden’s unveiling
4.1.1. Public interest and unlawfulness
The ﬁrst parts of the reports express that the revelations are in the public interest and cri-
ticise the scope (‘massive’ and ‘huge scale’) of online surveillance, yet not online surveil-
lance itself. Snowden declares, ‘I think the public is owed an explanation of the people who
make the disclosure that are outside of the democratic model. When you are subverting
the power of government that is a fundamentally dangerous thing to democracy …’ Jour-
nalists describe that Snowden was ‘deeply bothered and concerned’ and quote Snowden
8 J. A. LISCHKA
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describing surveillance as ‘grave threat to civil liberties.’ These statements refer to a moral
evaluation giving public interest and democracy a higher priority than security practices.
Further delegitimation of online surveillance is created by ascribing authority to Snowden
through positive attributions of being a celebrated hero (see Figure 1 for an overview of
[de]legitimation arguments). The anchors mention that Snowden’s revelations have
caused ‘a storm of outrage’ in the USA, a petition of supporters of Snowden ‘hailing
him a national hero,’ collecting ‘thousands of signatures’ and that ‘Mr. Snowden is cele-
brated’ by Hong Kong newspapers.
The surveillance practices are additionally delegitimised through reference to the law.
The BBC security correspondent explains that surveillance practices of NSA and
GCHQ could be unlawful since ‘Americans to spy on Britons,’ which is complemented
with Snowden’s description of mass surveillance practices, ‘The NSA targets the com-
munications of everyone. It ingests them by default. It ﬁlters them and analyses them
and measures and stores them for periods of time.’ Snowden’s statement emphasises
insatiability of online surveillance practices. The reports give much voice to Snowden him-
self for delegitimising mass surveillance, but give only once voice to a citizen mentioning
in a 10-second statement examples of mass surveillance in private life, ‘Your bank records,
your phone conversations, your e-mail, your documents. Anything that is connected
online, they are taking.’ This statement as well as Snowden’s description of the NSA sur-
veillance practice indicate a large volume of surveillance.
Figure 1. (De)legitimation arguments for online surveillance. Source: compiled by the author. Note:
The course of the debate is indicated with arrows. Concluding (de)legitimation arguments are
framed and key arguments printed in bold for each case.
INFORMATION, COMMUNICATION & SOCIETY 9
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
ZH
 H
au
ptb
ibl
iot
he
k /
 Z
en
tra
lbi
bli
oth
ek
 Z
ür
ich
] a
t 0
5:5
2 2
5 J
uly
 20
16
 
Besides the citizen statement, the reports do not clarify what data exactly are collected
by the security agencies. Thus, although the immensity of online surveillance is under-
standable for the audience, it remains unclear to what extent online surveillance affects
each society member on a personal level.
4.1.2. Lawfulness and need for security
The initial argument of the unlawfulness of online surveillance is immediately contrasted
with voices against Snowden’s revelations and legitimation reasons for online surveillance.
Most statements by governmental bodies are critical about Snowden and supportive of the
current state of surveillance practices. Governmental actors discredit and de-authorise
Snowden by referring to negative representations. An often showed statement of the
Foreign Secretary MP describes Snowden’s accusations as ‘baseless’, ‘fanciful’, and ‘non-
sense’. Also the critical US president’s and the director of the NSA’s stances (‘reckless’
and ‘unpatriotic, dangerous to American interest’) are mentioned. A member of the Min-
istry of Defence emphasises that ‘surveillance is necessary in cyber as in ordinary space,’ it
is ‘within a strict legal and policy framework,’ and ‘we need […] not be so worried.’ These
messages express that surveillance is lawful and should be trusted. This governmental
actor legitimises online surveillance by referring to the law as institutionalised authority
and conformity to ofﬂine surveillance (‘as in ordinary space’). Mass surveillance is also jus-
tiﬁed by its ability to prevent terror, which represents an instrumental rationalisation of
having an important positive utility for society. A journalist reports that social online
media ‘also become a place to hatch terror plots’ and that surveillance is ‘needed to prevent
terrorist attacks.’ This instrumental rationalisation is related to the moral value of public
security.
The unlawfulness of Snowden’s revelations is associated with these legitimation strat-
egies emphasising the lawfulness of surveillance. Snowden’s disappearance in Hong
Kong is associated with the legal consequences for Snowden facing ‘decades in jail.’ Snow-
den is quoted stating ‘You cannot come up against these intelligence agencies and be free
from risk, because they are such powerful adversaries.’ This statement relates to a David
and Goliath constellation between Snowden and intelligence agencies and are told from
David’s perspective and thus somewhat legitimise Snowden’s disappearance. Snowden’s
disappearance in Hong Kong is presented as mythopoetic story with open ending and
suggests two interpretations. First, Snowden is an outlaw and a traitor, which is why
the government wants to jail him. Second, the security agencies’ and governments’
power is globally threatening Snowden’s well-being.
4.1.3. Balance surveillance against privacy
The need to balance security against surveillance is often a conclusion of the reports. A
security correspondent summarises, ‘Some will share his concern about this huge scale
of surveillance. Others will say this is what is needed to prevent terrorist attacks and
worry that his revelations might compromise that ability,’ giving a reason why surveillance
is needed. The Business secretary MP is quoted stating, ‘you have got to have it […] it has
to be proportionate. You cannot have generalised snooping of individuals and you have to
have some oversight, legal and political.’ This criticism also relates to a moral evaluation of
values such as accountability and democratic division of powers. Both statements lack a
reason why a huge scale of surveillance should be avoided. Snowden’s delegitimising
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argument that mass surveillance risks democracy is not explicitly taken on by editorial
agents or other sources. Thus, the conclusions from the news reports are that current sur-
veillance practices are going too far but are useful against terror, and that privacy should at
most be balanced with online surveillance.
4.2. David Miranda’s detention
4.2.1. Unlawfulness and press freedom
The longer news reports of this case start from the journalists’ perspective suggesting that
the state made a mistake and conclude with implications for press freedom. The reports
give voice to the persons concerned, David Miranda and Glenn Greenwald, who are
upset about the events. The Chair of the Home Affairs Select Committee and the Liberal
Democrat’s spokesman critically comment the detention and reveal surprise (‘raises more
than my eyebrows’). The reports partly phonetically emphasise the detention duration
‘nine hours’ and contain emotional expressions such as ‘extraordinary,’ ‘awful,’ ‘abused’
or ‘stretched’ law, causing ‘huge reactions’ from a ‘furious’ public, etc., indicating that
the detention is dubious and unlawful. The discussion around the lawfulness of the deten-
tion relates to the authorisation of delegitimation strategy.
In one case, the public views are presented by a Liberal Democrats spokesperson men-
tioning reactions on Twitter, ‘They are furious that this has happened. They are extremely
concerned at the idea that anybody can be detained on such slim evidence and such slim
guidance on nine hours.’ Thus, the legitimacy of the detention is strongly questioned
through moral evaluation referring to the value of adequacy.
After the initial reports, the following ones take an overall journalists’ standpoint begin-
ning with the argument of threatening press freedom. The relating law, the Terrorism Act
2000, is discussed from the perspective of press freedom and thus its authority is ques-
tioned. A reporter concludes, ‘Before this detention, the talk around this particular law
had focussed on civil liberties. Now the issue of journalistic freedom is part of the debate.’
Two reports combine the detention and the destruction of theGuardian’s hard drives add-
ing a further press freedom example and recalls the necessity of a public debate about sur-
veillance. The Guardian editor Alan Rusbridger states ‘This is subject of high public
importance […] You cannot write about that if you have not got informed material
and facts to deal with. […] The British government has moved against the Guardian in
a way that would be undoable in America.’ This reference to US law delegitimises the
actions of the UK government. He calls the destruction disproportionate and reﬂecting
an ‘old-fashioned attitude towards national security,’ further delegitimising state control.
Rusbridger calls the Terrorism Act ‘bizarre’ and lines out that ‘That’s what’s disturbing
people. That a measure that’s supposed to be against terrorists is being used against jour-
nalists,’ morally evaluating the values public debate and press freedom. Furthermore, he
emphasises that ‘whole Europe is discussing this.’ This reference to the European discus-
sion provides legitimacy for the moral evaluation of the values of public interest and press
freedom and stresses the need to discuss the issues publicly in the UK.
Overall, the detention and destruction of the Guardian’s hard drives are story-like
described by David Miranda and Alan Rusbridger, respectively, which is comparable to
a David versus Goliath tale with powerful state authorities told from the weaker David’s
perspective and represents a mythopoesis strategy for delegitimation of the state’s actions.
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4.2.2. Need for security
A reporter calls the destruction an ‘act of vandalism’ and concludes ‘The Government will
be hoping that the public is convinced by this argument of public safety rather than the
Guardian’s argument about press freedom…’ An anchor starts with ‘It’s been described
as the most serious threat to press freedom Britain has seen for ages. Alternatively, it
was the action of the state, concerned for the welfare and security of its citizens. Desperate
measures for desperate times.’
Whereas the BBC reports in detail and from supporting and opposing perspectives,
news on other channels have not reported about the detention or only very brieﬂy from
one perspective, as on Channel 5 News. These shorter reports often begin from the state’s
perspective supporting its need for security, for example, ‘The Home Ofﬁce and Scotland
Yard have been threatened with legal action.’ Furthermore, the defending statement of the
Home Secretary Theresa May is often part of the reports, ‘the government should protect
the public if the police believe somebody has highly sensitive stolen information, which
could help terrorists and lead to a loss of lives.’ The detention is justiﬁed by state, data,
and public security and possible threats through terrorism and therefore follows a ration-
alisation and moral evaluation strategy.
4.3. Snooping on embassies and world leaders
4.3.1. Breach of trust
The espionage revelations are related to Edward Snowden who is called a ‘hero’ by Julian
Assange, whose statement is shown in one report on embassy snooping, because ‘he has
told the people of the world and the United States that there is mess, unlawful interception
of their communication,’ which assigns authority to Snowden. One report cites Snowden
suggesting that spying was ‘more widespread than previously known with more than 35
world leaders targeted.’ The outrage of Angela Merkel calling the snooping ‘completely
inacceptable’ and ‘a serious breach of trust’ if it was true, the German people, the anger
of the French diplomat, and President of the EU Parliament are touched on several
times throughout the reports. The President of the European Parliament says that he
was ‘deeply shocked’ and ‘angry’ that the US spies on members of the EU. These emotional
reactions relate to a moral evaluation concerning the value of political partnership and
trust that were damaged. The US reaction supports this negative moral evaluation since
‘The US is reviewing the way that we gather intelligence to properly balance the concerns
of citizens and allies,’ says a White House press secretary.
One report states that the German public reacts sensitively to surveillance due to the
distinctive past of ‘Stasi’, the Ministry for State Security in former East Germany vastly
spying on the population in order to ﬁght any opposition, ‘Memories here of surveillance
in East Germany are fresh, and Germans were outraged about leaks coming from Edward
Snowden.’ This example highlights a serious and threatening historical aspect of surveil-
lance for a population. However, such an aspect is not taken up or discussed in relation to
the current surveillance situation by the sources or journalists.
4.3.2. Everybody does it
However, UK sources, be it politicians or foreign correspondents, do not express great sur-
prise about the US spying activities. It is assumed that Merkel’s anger is played. She ‘has to
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really climb the highest ladder of annoyance but a lot of crocodile tears are being shared
here,’ because they suggest that everybody is spying on each other. This argumentation
refers to a conformity authorisation suggesting that spying is legitimate because ‘every-
body does it’. In addition, the intelligence services are described to do what they have
to do ‘to keep us in one piece,’ which is an instrumental rationalisation for the purpose
of security, relating to a moral evaluation of public security. The great extent of surveil-
lance is touched stating ‘that people all over the world may have their information hoov-
ered up.’ The ﬁnal report on snooping concludes with stating that ‘Most of the time we
don’t really know what they [intelligence] want to do or what they need to do. They
[affected parties] need to all get over this.’
Whereas the reactions of German or French sources point at a moral difﬁculty of the
spying activities by the USA, the lack of outrage by the UK sources and the lack of a debate
whether this had any consequences for the UK mute moral questions.
4.3. Lee Rigby report
4.3.3. Need for security and terrorism
Broadcasts usually begin with statements from the Prime Minister requesting legis-
lation enabling broader surveillance. The emergency of further legislation is emphasised
in a statement of an MP, ‘that people will die in this country who would have been
safe if that [legislation] had been in place’. Facebook is described as ‘safe-haven’ for
terrorists but the role of Internet companies should be ‘to keep us safe’ and ‘to help
a British counter-terrorist investigation.’ The Prime Minister calls agencies ‘silent
heroes.’
4.3.4. Privacy and ineffectiveness of online surveillance
Many broadcasts contrast the Prime Minister’s request for a new legislation by adding
alternative sources such as representatives of the Open Rights Group and other non-gov-
ernmental organisations criticising the scope of online surveillance. A human-rights acti-
vist states, ‘At times when they [security agencies] want to pull back on civil liberties,
snoop on, they pull out terrorism as a trump card.’ But if security agencies had access
to any information, this would lead to ‘an absolute surveillance state at which point
nobody has any kind of freedom to manoeuvre. You sacriﬁce the very thin you’re tempting
to defend. Terrorists win.’ These statements use moral evaluations by indicating values of
public debate, privacy, and civil liberty. A spokesperson of a counter-extremism organis-
ation states that searching in online communication for terrorism search terms ‘would not
help you ﬁnd a needle in a haystack. It would add more hay.’ Similarly, intelligence
agencies would go on a ‘ﬁshing expedition’ in communication content. These arguments
deny the instrumental rational legitimation of online surveillance’s positive effect of secur-
ity but suggests an ineffective utility.
These alternative sources and their critical statements on surveillance practices
are unique in the broadcast surveillance debate. This explicit criticism was either
absent in previous cases or at most indicated through statements of Snowden himself
or partly through Alan Rusbridger regarding the destruction of the Guardian’s hard
drives.
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4.4. Charlie Hebdo aftermath
4.4.1. Need for security
The data legislation called ‘Snooper’s Charter’ is discussed in the background of the Paris
attacks to give security agencies more power to look at online communications, whereas
security chiefs want to close gaps in their ‘surveillance ability.’ The Home Secretary warns
that ‘every day that passes, the capability of the people who keep us safe diminishes. As
those more people in danger, crimes unpunished, innocent lives will be put at risk,’
using the moral evaluation of values of national security. This argument is also used by
a conservative MP stating that ‘Public safety must come above everything else and that
civil liberty must include not being bombed, shocked or beheaded.’ The Home Secretary
further assumes that ‘communications data was used in the Paris attacks to locate the sus-
pects,’ suggesting an effective utility of online surveillance which is related to instrumental
rationalisation.
4.4.2. Regulate power
The Liberal Democrats oppose the data legislation they refer to as ‘Snooper’s Charter’ and
it is warned that too much power is given to security agencies. The draft data bill was
rejected by a committee because it was
too vague, too widely drawn, too much power in the hands of Home Secretary. They rec-
ommended that a new legislation was needed in a far more limited way and the government
should provide more evidence and clarity about what they wanted to achieve.
This criticism also relates to a moral evaluation of values such as accountability and div-
ision of powers.
5. Discussion and conclusions
The (de)legitimising strategies in the broadcast surveillance discourse cover the four types
suggested by van Leeuwen andWodak (1999). Legitimising arguments more strongly refer
to instrumental rationality, that is, the utility of surveillance for safety and ﬁghting terror-
ism, which is related to a moral evaluation of public security (see Figure 1 for an overview).
This legitimation strategy relates to the purpose of a state to protect its population as lined
out by Foucault (2007). This issue of national security was also dominant in UK counter-
terrorism policy documents (MacDonald & Hunter, 2013). Delegitimising arguments
stress the moral evaluation of various values such as public interest, civil liberty, democ-
racy, press freedom, or division of power that have to be protected or restored, and use
mythopoesis telling David-and-Goliath type of stories from the perspective of David.
Snowden’s disappearing and David Miranda’s detention are story-like told and thus
may cause sympathy for the main characters. Some actors also deny a positive utility of
surveillance to weaken the argument of instrumental rationality. Both sides also refer to
authority legitimisations such as the law or conventionality and deny authority of or
ascribe authority to Snowden, respectively. Similarly, Schulze (2015) shows that referring
to the law is a dominant authorisation strategy in the German debate around the NSA-sur-
veillance scandal, which refers to the embassies and world leader snooping case in this
study.
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Perspectives on surveillance narrow down to the major theme terrorism prevention
versus civil liberty and privacy, which is similar to Barnard-Wills’ (2011) result of prevent-
ing criminality to limiting personal liberty. The repeated combination of instrumental
rationality (terror prevention) and moral evaluation (public security) functions as a
thought-terminating cliché for most delegitimising arguments.
Overall, there are no delegitimising arguments challenging online surveillance in gen-
eral, but challenging arguments are related to surveillance practices. The most critical dis-
courses on surveillance are held in reporting the David Miranda detention and the Lee
Rigby report. The former is treated as infringing press freedom. The latter refers to inef-
fective surveillance practices pointing out that broader online surveillance ‘would not help
you ﬁnd a needle in a haystack. It would add more hay.’However, the delegitimising moral
evaluation arguments are less explicitly than the legitimising rationalisation argument
referring to terrorist threats. Civil liberties and privacy remain abstract, intangible
terms. Except for obtaining bank records and reading emails, the detention of potentially
innocent people in the David Miranda case, and destruction of corporate property in the
case of the Guardian’s hard drives, no threats to civil liberties of general people are men-
tioned. Explicit risks for democracy and society through changes in human behaviour as
described by Sloan and Warner (2015), Acquisti et al. (2015), or Stoycheff (2016) are not
part of the analysed broadcasts. Thus, threats to civil liberties and privacy appear negligible
compared to terrorist threats within the British broadcast discourse on surveillance.
When comparing the rationalisation arguments of terrorist threats, the explicitness
increases over time. Over the course of the cases, the expressions used for terroristic
threats become more detailed. In the beginning, ‘terrorist attacks’ are rather factually men-
tioned (Snowden’s unveiling), then terrorism ‘could […] lead to a loss of lives’ (David Mir-
anda detention), later ‘people will die in this country’ (Lee Rigby report), and ﬁnally ‘being
bombed, shocked or beheaded’ (Charlie Hebdo aftermath) explicitly describe several ways
leading to a loss of lives, which strengthens the instrumental rationality legitimation
arguments.
Whereas the sources for legitimation are often governmental actors, sources of delegi-
timation arguments are more diverse and vary for each case. In three cases, that is, Snow-
den’s unveiling, the Lee Rigby report, and the aftermath of Charlie Hebdo, the focus is on
elite actors who can mainly frame the surveillance interpretation as legitimate within
broadcasts. The delegitimation strategies are mostly expressed by Snowden himself, jour-
nalists, governmental actors, and non-governmental organisations. Some (oppositional)
politicians request a discussion about the proportionality of surveillance, which is a sign
of a more moderate viewpoint of the state. However, the broadcast discourse tends to
give governmental, pro-surveillance actors a voice by default. In contrast, it is harder
for non-governmental actors to continuously interpret the broadcast discourse.
From a normative view, the broadcast news discourse touches challenging and justify-
ing arguments, which is necessary to enable rational discussions in public. Thus, broadcast
news cannot be described as government lapdog (McGarrity, 2011). A damage by Snow-
den’s leaks as found in newspaper reporting by Branum and Charteris-Black (2015) is only
a minor aspect in the broadcast debate. There are also no major differences in the surveil-
lance discourse in broadcasts across TV or radio channels as in British newspapers caused
by their editorial stance (Branum & Charteris-Black, 2015). However, pro-surveillance
arguments are expressed explicitly through terrorism having an immense negative threat
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for society compared to contra-surveillance arguments. Thus, the more powerful argu-
ments in combination with a default coverage may be received as more convincing by
the audience than contra-surveillance arguments. In fact, what exactly is at stake when
mass surveillance is broadened remains obscure in the broadcast discourse and thus is
non-existent. Simone’s (2009, p. 12) conclusion, ‘If surveillance is security and security
is liberty, then perhaps we would be better off living dangerously,’ does not come clearly
across in the UK broadcast surveillance debate.
To conclude, the surveillance discourse should be richer especially in order to give the
audience a chance to understand the less concrete contra-surveillance arguments better.
This underreporting is not caused by ‘security and intelligence censorship’ (Herfroy-Mis-
chler, 2015, p. 244) but by not extensively enough including alternative sources than gov-
ernmental actors and by the challenge to explain surveillance threats to democracy in a
more tangible way to the public. Thus, the media should focus on how the surveillance
debate can be ‘broadened to enable a wider societal debate informed by the experiences
of those subjected to targeted surveillance and associated state violence,’ as proposed by
Gürses et al. (2016, p. 577).
There are major limitations connected to this broadcast analysis. First, the sample is the
best that could be accessed based on two extensive databases. Since the observation periods
are selected based on previously identiﬁed major events in surveillance coverage, major
broadcast reports are part of the sample. However, it remains unclear how many broad-
casts on surveillance not related to one of the cases are overlooked and are missed out due
to the keyword search and the way TV versus radio broadcasts are represented in the data-
bases used for searching. Surveillance matters may be discussed more broadly in other
broadcasts not related to one of the cases. Hence, a conclusion that the general surveillance
debate has become less diverse and has given pro-surveillance arguments more room since
the Lee Rigby report cannot be drawn. Second, the analysis cannot evaluate whether the
coverage of surveillance in British media is extensive relative to other topics. Also, in
order to assess the British news media discourse on surveillance, an additional analysis
of newspaper and online news outlets is necessary. Alternative news sources such as
blogs can reveal a discourse produced by a wider circle of actors than journalists and edi-
tors. Finally, it would be interesting to assess how the audience actually perceives and
understands the surveillance discourse in the media and whether chilling effects result
for democratic discourses, as suggested by Stoycheff (2016).
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